

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**Routing Slip**

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		SUSPENSE	2 July 82 Date		

Remarks:

Please prepare an acknowledgment for the
DCI's signature.

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D/Executive Secretary
25 June 82

Date


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State Dept. review completed



UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

WASHINGTON



OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

June 23, 1982

Dear Bill,

As you see from the enclosed, I
am trying to carry out the policy we
discussed on your birthday.

Yours, as ever,

Enclosure:

Letter to Judge Clark,
with enclosures

The Honorable
William J. Casey,
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency.

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UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachments

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

June 22, 1982

Dear Bill,

The current crisis in the Middle East leads me to conclude that I must bring my long campaign for a review of our Middle Eastern policy to a head. As you know, I have been trying to obtain such a review for many months in the interstices of my schedule. Without vigorous and effective American leadership in the Middle East, it is impossible to carry out our arms control objectives for the area, including those of our non-proliferation policy.

The President ordered such a review last December on the basis of an ACDA memorandum dated November 5, 1981, and directed ACDA and the State Department to prepare the basic paper for an NSC meeting. After trying in vain to obtain State Department cooperation, ACDA filed the necessary documents in March, with your approval. Nothing has happened since.

The record speaks for itself. As an exercise in administration, it is appalling. It is equally appalling in substance. It would be the understatement of the year to point out that if the United States had seized the initiative in the Middle East early in the Administration, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon would not have been necessary. During the transition period, the Casey Committee strongly recommended such a policy as a most urgent priority. ACDA recommended the same approach ever since I arrived here a year ago -notably in my memorandum to Al of August 18, 1981, on the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia. If we had pursued this course we might well have made some progress

The Honorable
William P. Clark,
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs.

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Review for Declass on: 6/21/94

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towards achieving the broader goals of our foreign and security policy for the area.

Next to Poland, the Middle East is the most important item on our foreign policy agenda, in terms both of what we might accomplish and of what can go wrong. The situation in the region remains tense and dangerous, but Israel's stunning victory over the PLO in Lebanon gives us unparalleled opportunities to advance our interests. We should not repeat Meade's mistake at Gettysburg -- i.e., failing to pursue our enemy in retreat. The Soviet Union has sustained a major defeat in the Middle East. We should take full advantage of it.

We should now be acting with the largest possible coalition of our allies to get Syria and the PLO out of Lebanon, and establish a government there based on a new community formula of equality; to press Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia to carry out their obligations to make peace under Security Council Resolution 338; and to strengthen our military presence in the Gulf region and prepare actively to safeguard our profound interests in Iran, which have been publicly declared both in the Eisenhower Doctrine Resolution and in the bilateral agreement with Iran pursuant to that Resolution.

Some members of the Administration have criticized Israel's actions as "aggression" and are still flirting with various sanctions against Israel instead of single-mindedly pursuing our own goals. But Israel's invasion of Lebanon is an act of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nation's Charter, justified by the same principle on which Great Britain relied in the Falkland Islands affair. Under international law, Lebanon owes Israel an absolute obligation to prevent its territory from being used as a base for armed attack against Israel. Since Lebanon and the United Nations have been unable to prevent such armed attacks, Israel is entitled to use whatever force is necessary to obtain redress for Lebanon's breach of international law. The law on the subject was authoritatively declared by President Monroe in 1819 and by Secretary of State Webster in 1840 or thereabouts. It has been applied hundreds of times -- notably by Wilson against Mexico.

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There is another dimension to this problem. According to my recollection

Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 1976 in exchange for assurances that there would be no attacks on Israel from Lebanese territory. Those promises were the predicate for establishing the UN presence in the area, but they have not been carried out. This factor, of course, recalls the unhappy background of the Israeli raid in Iraq last summer. It goes without saying that we should treat this aspect of the controversy with great care.

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The President's speech at the UN on June 17 was a long step forward. Confronting the rising tide of aggression, the President said our policy is not simply to condemn aggression, but to enforce the rules of the United Nations Charter against it. And, responding to Brezhnev's no-first-use proposal, he said all the nations should rededicate themselves to the rules of Article 2(4), and renounce all forms of aggression, nuclear or conventional. If we begin to orient our foreign policy around this basic principle -- the principle that peace is indivisible -- the idea of "the rule of law" will cease to be a pious platitude we recite on ceremonial occasions, and our foreign policy will begin to gain momentum.

When that happens, as I said at the NSC meeting on May 3, we will have a chance to succeed in our INF, START, MBFR, and chemical warfare negotiations and the other items on the arms control agenda, including the nuclear weapons free zone project for the Middle East. But not before.

I therefore propose that the NSC meeting ordered by the President last December be held, or, if the President prefers, that you and I discuss this set of problems with him.

For your convenience, I enclose the documents in the case, in chronological order.

Yours sincerely,

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Enclosures:

- Tab A. ACDA Memorandum to the Secretary,
August 18, 1981
- Tab B. ACDA Memorandum, November 5, 1981
- Tab C. Memorandum of the President,
December 22, 1981
- Tab D. Memorandum to the President from
Director of ACDA and ACDA Staff
Paper, March 3, 1982

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